Western strategic interests in Ukraine center on avoiding a direct NATO - Russia confrontation while ensuring Ukraine survives Russia’s attempt to subjugate it. U.S. weapons stockpiles, especially regarding air defense and finite offensive capabilities such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, must also be closely monitored to avoid depletion. This is a key concern vis-a-vis the growing risk of war with China .
Still, contrary to the Kremlin's propaganda, allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons against Russian military targets does not cross Russian red lines. It does not do so for the same two reasons that allowed NATO to avoid direct war with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
First, Russian President Vladimir Putin knows he and not the West sparked the current escalation. Putin did so by launching an offensive against Ukraine's northeastern bastion city of Kharkiv. Seizing Kharkiv, Russian forces would be only 250 miles from Kyiv as the crow flies. In addition, it was Putin, not the West, who launched a sabotage campaign to blow up factories, warehouses, and military targets on NATO soil. Top line: Russia's clamor against Western escalation is unserious beyond its desire to spread fear among Western voters and bolster Russian popular support for the bloody war effort.
Second, bearing relevance to Russian nuclear brinkmanship, Putin recognizes that NATO has superior means of actually getting its nuclear warheads onto Russian targets. That is the key measure of deterrence even if Russia has more nuclear warheads in total. Yes, Russia has a number of nominally more advanced hypersonic delivery systems in service, but they are broadly untested and have been found wanting when used in conventional strikes in Ukraine.
Too few Western countries appear to understand that Russia's red lines have not been crossed. Ironically, however, in so desperately, publicly, and relentlessly begging Putin to believe that they do not seek escalation, they risk encouraging Putin's belief that he can escalate unilaterally to his own advantage. The Biden administration offers the most important example of this.
While now allowing Ukraine to use some U.S. weapons against military targets inside Russia, President Joe Biden says Ukraine can use U.S. weapons only against Russian-located targets that pose a current and imminent threat to forces surrounding Kharkiv. Ukraine still cannot use the most effective ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles inside Russia. This restriction prevents Ukrainian strikes from maximizing their potential to evade Russian air and electronic warfare defenses and quickly destroy targets of opportunity.
Other European powers have adopted the same restrictions. Germany's Olaf Scholz has knelt to Russian intimidation and still won't give Ukraine the Taurus missile. He's also limiting Ukraine's use of German weapons to Kharkiv-related targets. When asked whether Ukraine could launch attacks at targets just over the Russian border from southeastern Ukraine, the German defense minister lied by saying those attacks couldn't be effective.
Then there's France. Undercutting his recent leadership in support of Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron has said Ukraine can use French weapons only against Russian combat forces launching attacks on Kharkiv. This will play to enduring Western perceptions that Macron is an ultimately unreliable security partner. And Belgium, one of NATO's most egregious freeloaders , says the F-16s it provides won't be able to operate in Russian airspace.
Not everyone is so unduly hesitant. Poland and the Baltics place no restrictions on their weapon supplies. Similarly, Denmark and the Netherlands have offered positive signals that their F-16 fighter jets will be employable by Ukraine with few restrictions.
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The problem is that when matched to their make-it-up-on-the-go weapons restrictions, the ad infinitum public attestations by Western leaders against escalation actually risk encouraging Putin's further escalation. The British-Baltic-Polish approach is better. It reflects an understanding of Russian psychology and the reciprocal Western interest in adopting policies that broadcast both strategic clarity and strategic resolution. The Russians see weakness as bloodied prey in the water, a salivating prospect for further attack. But as in the Cold War, they respect strength designed to counterforce their own aggression.
Excluding elements of Russian nuclear command and control (to include the Russian political leadership), Ukraine should thus be allowed to use Western weapons against military targets supporting Russia’s war effort.
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