Where a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights was denied, a remand must be ordered for a determination of whether the father provided his child with regular and substantial support for the requisite two-year period.
“In this stepparent-adoption case concerning the minor child, MSL, petitioners, Ashley LaPoint and Jeremy Baker, appeal by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of respondent, Alexander Saintclair, under MCR 2.116(C)(10). LaPoint and Saintclair married in 2012 and divorced in 2016. MSL was born of the marriage in 2014. LaPoint and Baker married in 2021. And in 2022, they petitioned the trial court to terminate Saintclair’s parental rights to MSL and to name Baker the child’s adoptive father. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that petitioners could not establish the requirements of MCL 710.51(6)(a) as necessary to terminate Saintclair’s parental rights, concluding that Saintclair had provided MSL with regular and substantial support in the form of healthcare insurance for the requisite two-year period. Therefore, the trial court summarily denied and dismissed the stepparent-adoption petition. We hold that making healthcare insurance available to a child does constitute an act of providing ‘support’ for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a) and that the trial court correctly ruled that Saintclair provided MSL with ‘regular’ support in the form of insurance during the pertinent two-year window. But, nonetheless, we reverse and remand for further proceedings with respect to whether that support was ‘substantial’ in light of Saintclair’s overall ability to provide support.
“In this case, there is no dispute that Saintclair did not provide ‘support’ in the form of payments of money during the two-year period preceding the filing of the stepparent-adoption petition. Instead, he relied on the availability of the Humana Policy to cover MSL’s healthcare needs during the relevant two-year span for purposes of establishing that he provided MSL with regular and substantial support. We hold that making healthcare insurance available for a child plainly constitutes an act in which ‘support’ is provided to the child for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a). This is true regardless whether the custodial parent utilizes the support or insurance for the benefit of the child and regardless of the circumstances under which the noncustodial parent acquired the healthcare insurance in the first place. MCL 710.51(6)(a) simply does not delineate, describe, or limit the form of the ‘support’ that must be provided to satisfy the provision. We additionally rule that because the healthcare insurance was available to MSL for the entire two-year lookback period, Saintclair provided ‘regular’ support. On that matter, we find no error by the trial court.
“With respect to the question whether the support was ‘substantial,’ the trial court found as a matter of law that providing the healthcare insurance to MSL was indeed substantial; however, the court did not appear to take into consideration or evaluate the evidence that Saintclair received $1,200 a month in military disability payments and possibly additional prison income given that his gross annual income back in 2017 was $18,500. In other words, the trial court did not assess Saintclair’s overall ability to support MSL. Under the circumstances posed in this case, MCL 710.51(6)(a) requires contemplation of a parent’s ability to provide support. This would entail consideration of the noncustodial parent’s income, expenses, and general financial status and situation. And measuring whether support is ‘substantial’ in any given case necessarily requires an examination of the noncustodial parent’s income and finances. For example, if a parent provided a child $500 a month in support on a monthly income of $800, the support would easily be characterized as ‘substantial.’ But if that same parent provided $500 in monthly support on a monthly income of $10,000, it would be difficult to reach the conclusion that the support was substantial. MCL 710.51(6)(a) effectively mandates an analysis in which the ‘ability to support’ a child sets the parameters of what constitutes ‘regular and substantial support.’ The trial court erred by not conducing an analysis and examination of Saintclair’s ability to support MSL in relation to the question whether simply providing her with healthcare insurance was ‘substantial.’
“The trial court erred by not examining and considering Saintclair’s ability to provide support for purposes of determining whether he provided ‘substantial’ support for MSL during the two-year lookback period. The issue is to be entertained on remand, whether at trial or in a new motion for summary disposition.”
In re MSL; MiLW 07-108096, 12 pages; Michigan Court of Appeals published; Markey, J., joined by Riordan, J., Cameron, J.; on appeal from Livingston Circuit Court; Charles W. Widmaier for appellant; Ashley B. Jacobson for appellee.
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