The Guardian view on the Covid inquiry’s first report: poor preparation with tragic consequences | Editorial

Citizens of all four nations of the UK were failed by politicians and officials who neglected to prepare properly for a pandemic or other civil emergency. Former UK health secretaries Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock did not update or improve an inadequate pandemic strategy from 2011, that was geared towards flu rather than a novel virus. Resources that did exist were “constrained” by funding and, after 2018, redirected towards Brexit planning. Ministers were guilty of groupthink and did not make effective use of external experts or challenge scientific advice. The possibility of a lockdown was never seriously considered. Nor was enough attention paid to the likely impact of a pandemic on vulnerable groups .

These highly critical conclusions from the first module of the Covid inquiry are a landmark moment in the process of national reckoning being overseen by Heather Hallett. This is the first time that relatives of the 230,000 people who died of Covid have seen their anger about official failures, both before and during the pandemic, endorsed in such an authoritative way.

Lady Hallett’s six-month deadline for responses to her 10 recommendations creates a tight timeline for the new government and the devolved administrations. A decision by Sir Keir Starmer about whether to adopt her central proposal, for a new, independent statutory body, should be expected soon. The expectation is that he will follow this and other recommendations, including the creation of a UK-wide civil emergency strategy, to be reviewed every three years.

This report, focused on resilience and preparedness, is the clearest indicator to date of Lady Hallett’s approach to her mammoth task. With eight modules remaining, and more to be announced, these findings and recommendations are the first of many. Past mistakes are acknowledged, along with those responsible . Particularly concerning is the inability of politicians to respond effectively to unfolding events, to alter course and challenge advice. Lady Hallett calls for an end to “the culture of consensus in which orthodoxy becomes entrenched”. But there is more emphasis on systems than individuals. The focus is on what needs to change and how.

The inquiry process is labour-intensive; the government department tasked with responding to it has 265 staff. But Lady Hallett is clear that the response from the UK government and devolved administrations must be swift. Another pandemic is likely in the near to medium future, and another virus could be more transmissible and lethal than Covid‑19. Unless an understanding of what went wrong is absorbed quickly, the opportunity to prevent similar mistakes from being repeated could be lost.

The report recognises that the health and care systems were working “close to, if not beyond, capacity” when the pandemic hit. But while a finding that both were underfunded is arguably implicit in such findings, Lady Hallett steers clear of direct criticism of political decisions about public spending. This has understandably disappointed some members of the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice UK group, and other critics of previous governments. But the report is not, and should not be mistaken for, an exoneration. The scope of the issues under consideration is vast, and Lady Hallett is determined that her inquiry’s recommendations should be acted upon. At a time when a new government is faced with multiple public policy challenges including a prisons crisis, this pragmatic and purposeful document is a solid building block.