‘Co-opted’ by Saudi intelligence, FBI informant allegedly played vital role in 9/11 preparations

Dr. Abdussattar Shaikh, the FBI informant who shared his home with Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, had in fact been “co-opted” by a Saudi intelligence asset with whom he shared a close, years-long relationship.

The allegation surfaced in federal court in New York in the long-running civil court case in which families and survivors of 9/11 are suing Saudi Arabia for the role the Kingdom’s employees allegedly played in the attack. It is contained in a document filed by the plaintiffs.

The Saudi intelligence asset, Omar al-Bayoumi, helped the two future hijackers settle into life in the United States in 2000. After 9/11, 2001, he and Fahad Thumairy, an official at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles, became the subjects of a lengthy FBI probe, Operation Encore, that sought to establish whether they had “wittingly provided such assistance” while knowing that Hazmi and Mihdhar “were in the U.S. to commit an act of terrorism.”

The FBI informant, Dr. Shaikh, was never publicly acknowledged by the bureau, and is identified in the 9/11 Commission Report as “an apparently law-abiding citizen with friendly, long-standing contacts among local police and FBI personnel” who opened his home to the hijackers after meeting them at the local mosque.

Now, citing fresh witness testimony, FBI files and evidence retrieved from Bayoumi’s home by British police in 2001 but apparently never previously examined, the plaintiffs’ legal team is painting a troubling portrait of Dr. Shaikh’s role.

The case has reached a critical juncture, with U.S. District Court Judge George Daniels due soon to decide whether to affirm or deny the Kingdom’s request to dismiss the claims against it.

DR. SHAIKH’S ALLEGED ROLE

In a court filings and in oral arguments opposing the Kingdom’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ lawyers contend that Dr. Shaikh was “recruited” by Bayoumi to house an “advance team” sent to California to assess it as an al Qaeda base; that Bayoumi took Shaikh to Los Angeles to introduce him to alleged Saudi co-conspirator, Fahad Thumairy; that Thumairy and Bayoumi “hired” Shaikh to perform tasks for the Saudi government; that Bayoumi planned for Hazmi and Mihdhar to stay with Shaikh more than a year in advance of their arrival in the U.S.; and that he arranged his own travel schedule to be back in San Diego for moving day.

Entries in Bayoumi’s address book link Dr. Shaikh to the two Saudi religious propagators, Adel Mohamed al-Sadhan and Mutaeb al-Sudairy, who made up the “advance team”. Having hosted the two men, Shaikh subsequently traveled to the Kingdom to visit the pair. Videotapes seized by British police show Shaikh dining at Bayoumi’s home and accompanying Bayoumi to the mosque where Fahad Thumairy worked at the time. Bayoumi admitted he had steered the two future hijackers to Shaikh’s home.

In the plaintiffs’ arguments are eerie echoes of something colleague Anthony Summers was told years ago by former Florida U.S. Sen. Bob Graham, who died earlier this year. Democrat Graham co-chaired Congress’ Joint Inquiry into 9/11, and in retirement pursued a long campaign to uncover the truth about the Saudi role. “Dr. Shaikh,” Graham said, “was a close confidante of Bayoumi.”

The new evidence, the plaintiffs’ lawyers argue, confirms “Shaikh’s role as a Saudi agent and facilitator in San Diego,” and that Shaikh was “working for the KSA when Hazmi and Mihdhar lived with him.”

That view of Shaikh could not be more different than that of former San Diego FBI chief William Gore. Gore, who spent 32 years with the bureau, was Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the San Diego Field Office from 1997-2003. He went on to serve as San Diego County sheriff before retiring in 2022.

In an interview with Florida Bulldog , Gore acknowledged for the first time that Shaikh, who is now dead, had worked as an “informational asset” for the San Diego Field Office during his tenure as SAC. Gore called Dr. Shaikh, with whom he said he lunched regularly while sheriff, “one of the finest guys I ever met.”

3 FACES OF DR. SHAIKH: THE LANDLORD

On the afternoon of Sept. 11, FBI agents searching an abandoned car at Dulles Airport outside Washington, D.C., retrieved an address, 8451 Mt. Vernon Ave., Lemon Grove, CA. It led them to a modest two-story home in a working-class suburb of San Diego owned by 65-year-old Indian immigrant named Abdussattar Shaikh.

Years later, Daniel Gonzalez, one of the agents who followed up on the lead, recalled to ProPublica rushing to the address with a “small army” of colleagues, including a SWAT team with a battering ram, only to be surprised when the owner, Dr. Shaikh, answered their knock and let them in.

It would be a week before Gonzalez learned that Dr. Shaikh was an FBI informant, and, reportedly, weeks more before the local office informed FBI headquarters of that fact.

In the meantime, a portrait of Dr. Shaikh and his relationship with his young Saudi tenants began to emerge in press reports.

Shaikh was born in India in 1935. There, though a Muslim, he was educated in Catholic schools before emigrating to the United States in 1959. Arriving in San Diego in 1970, Shaikh said later, he was disappointed to find nowhere to worship. Dialing every Muslim-sounding name in the phone book, he quickly gathered 50 men to join him in prayer in an empty warehouse.

From that initial gathering grew the Islamic Center of San Diego, by 2001 the largest of 15 mosques in the city – with Shaikh as a respected founding member. Later, he founded the small Uthman Mosque in Lemon Grove. For several years at the turn of the millennium, he participated in Catholic-Muslim “dialogues.” Shaikh also spent eight years on the Citizens Review Board on Police Practices and had served as an honorary sheriff from 1971-1995.

Known affectionately in the community as ”the Doctor” – he had a Ph.D. – Shaikh had taught community college, but told a New York Times reporter after 9/11 that most of his income came from teaching English as a second language to Saudi naval officers and their families. He had divorced, and after his wife and sons moved out, began to take in foreign students.

He was “sad and hurt” when he heard about the 9/11 attacks, Shaikh told the Times. He was incredulous that two of the young men with whom he had shared his home could have perpetrated such acts. He suggested the pair “might have had their identities stolen by the real terrorists.”

“I am three times more upset than the average American,” Shaikh said.

Shaikh described the two future hijackers as quiet, religious and thoughtful family men. They said they wanted to learn English. They used his computer, but always went outside to use their cell phones – never using Shaikh’s landline. Although Shaikh offered them rooms for free, the pair insisted on paying him $300 per month in rent. They moved in, he said, in September 2000. Mihdhar was homesick, and returned to the Middle East after only six weeks to see his wife and new daughter.

Shaikh and others said the older man became especially close to Hazmi, whom he treated like a son. Shaikh helped the future hijacker open a bank account and renew his visa when it expired. When Hazmi said he wanted to find a Mexican wife who would be willing to convert to Islam, Shaikh helped him compose a personal ad.

In December 2000, Shaikh said, a friend of Hazmi’s named “Hani” arrived in San Diego. They were leaving for San Jose, Hazmi explained, to take flying lessons. For a month or so, Hazmi and the doctor exchanged friendly messages. Then, after calling to say he and “Hani” were off to Arizona for further flying lessons, Hazmi went silent. It was Shaikh’s last contact with his young friend.

Informant or not, the bureau had a lot of questions for Shaikh. In the months after the attack he was interviewed five times. Shaikh was “cooperative,” agents recorded, but a polygraph about whether he had any prior knowledge of the attack was “inconclusive.”

Then in the summer of 2002, investigators from Congress’ Joint Inquiry arrived in San Diego.

3 FACES OF DR. SHAIKH: THE INFORMANT

When congressional staff arrived, former SAC Gore told us, his office cooperated. He worried, though, when they were briefed about Shaikh’s relationship with the office.As Gore feared, Shaikh’s name, and that of his FBI handler, Special Agent Steven Butler, leaked to the press almost immediately.

Sen. Graham and Rep. Porter Goss, R-FL, the co-chairs of the Joint Inquiry, began pressing for access to the informant. It was denied. Graham recalled in his book “Intelligence Matters” that when he attempted to present FBI Counsel Kenneth Wainstein with a subpoena for Shaikh’s appearance before the committee, Wainstein “leaned back from the subpoena as if it were radioactive.”

Then-FBI Director Robert Mueller and Attorney General John Ashcroft objected strenuously to the committee calling Shaikh even though he had already been publicly outed. Instead, the bureau suggested the committee submit written questions. They did, but the FBI sat on the questions for weeks.

By then Shaikh had hired a retired Justice Department lawyer who told the committee that Shaikh would not appear for questioning without a formal grant of immunity. Nor would he answer written interrogatories.

The whole episode, Graham later wrote, left him wondering whether “the informant was using the FBI?…[did Shaikh] know something about the plot that would be even more damaging were it revealed?”

According to Graham, in the midst of all this back and forth, a senior member of the FBI congressional affairs staff sent him and Goss a letter saying the bureau was acting on orders from the White House. “The Administration,” the staffer said, “would not sanction a staff interview with the source.”

“We were seeing in writing what we had suspected for some time: the White House was directing the cover up.”

Where SAC Gore sat in San Diego, things looked very different. “When the FBI opens an Informational Asset, we make a commitment to that individual to keep their cooperation with the U.S. Government confidential,” he told Florida Bulldog .

It was a practical matter as well as a moral one. No one would ever agree to cooperate with the bureau again, Gore explained, if they could not protect their sources. “When Dr. Shaikh’s cooperation was leaked by Congress, it had a devastating impact on his standing in the Muslim community, professionally, personally and financially,” he said.

Shaikh’s handler, Agent Butler, had recruited the doctor – code name “Muppet” – as an “informational source” in May 1994. In lengthy appearances before the joint committee, the agent recalled their relationship.

“At some points, I would speak to the informant several times a day for hours at a time, while there were also periods that I did not speak with the informant for several months…in the summer of 2000 the informant told me that the informant met two individuals the informant described as good Muslim Saudi youths who were legally in the United States to visit and attend school. According to the informant, they were religious and not involved in criminal or political activities…At some later point, but before September 11, the informant told me their names were Nawaf and Khalid. The informant did not tell me their last names prior to September 11, 2001.”

Butler did not question Shaikh further about the hijackers, and did not keep a record of what Shaikh told him because “I only recorded information about persons with some nexus to international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence or criminal activity.” FBI headquarters concurred. There was no evidence of an al Qaeda presence in San Diego prior to 9/11, an FBI representative told the Joint Inquiry.

A later probe by the Justice Department’s Inspector General was likewise unable to interview Shaikh. The Inspector General “reviewed the asset’s file and noted the asset provided information on a regular basis on a variety of different individuals and topics,” but it was “not clear what information the asset had provided to the FBI about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11.” The FBI keeps information from Confidential Human Sources (CHS) like Shaikh separated from its ordinary file system. Shaikh’s CHS file, we were told, is unlikely ever to be released.

If he had been questioned, Shaikh might have supplied the names of four individuals he did tell the bureau about after the attacks. All four had been the subject of FBI investigations and three of them had been under active investigation at the time the future hijackers were living in San Diego. Though their names remain redacted in the Inquiry’s Report, one of the men has been identified in press reports as former Tampa resident Osama Mustafa.

Before 9/11 Mustafa owned a gas station where Hazmi worked for about a month while living with Dr. Shaikh. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Mustafa previously had been the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation that yielded no evidence of criminal conduct.

In 2013, Mustafa was convicted in connection with a $17-million tax-refund fraud scheme. He vanished while out on bond and was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison. In 2019, he was captured in Jordan and extradited. Mustafa is currently housed at a federal prison in Virginia and has a projected release date of Aug. 3, 2035.

Another man about whom Shaikh appears to have said nothing before the attacks was Yasser Bushnak, or, perhaps, Bugshan. Documents from Operation Encore released in late 2021 reveal that Shaikh repeatedly mentioned the man in his post-9/11 interviews. He was, Shaikh said, a wealthy Yemeni friend of Hazmi’s who visited the Lemon Grove house.

Bushnak/Bugshan was also friendly with Bayoumi and reportedly made a $40,000 donation to repair the roof of a local mosque at his request. Shaikh tried to get a similar donation from Bushnak for his own small mosque, but failed. In mid-2001, Shaikh and Bushnak attended a fundraiser for the Holy Land Foundation together. In December 2001, the Holy Land Foundation was designated as a terrorist entity by the Bush administration.

Bugshan, meanwhile, is a common Saudi name shared by, among others, members of one of the Kingdom’s largest conglomerates. Two “Bugshan”s are listed in Bayoumi’s address book for the relevant period.

That Hazmi might have introduced Bayoumi and Shaikh to such a wealthy friend, whichever last name is correct, is surely of note – even if the FBI’s informant missed it prior to 9/11.

Even in 2024, much of the section of the Joint Inquiry’s Report dealing with Shaikh remains redacted. What is available notes “significant inconsistencies” about the date on which Shaikh claimed to have met the future hijackers – he said it was September 2000, when in fact it had been May. There was evidence, too, that Shaikh might have met the pair even earlier. He never told the FBI about their flight training in San Diego. He claimed, against all the odds of probability, that future Flight 77 hijack pilot Hani Hanjour was not the “Hani” he had met.

Four other bulleted items questioning Shaikh’s credibility were redacted by government censors either completely or in substantial part.

When the Inquiry’s Report was made public, Dr. Shaikh was beside himself. He denied having acted as an informant. “This is the greatest country,” Shaikh bitterly told a reporter. “I try to bring Muslims into the mainstream and this is what I get.”

While Shaikh was never paid for his services to the bureau, he was given $100,000 when he was retired as a source. It was officialdom trying to compensate Shaikh for the FBI’s failure to protect his identity. But the payment could not, SAC Gore said, “restore the damage we had done to his personal and professional reputation in the community.”

“What is clear,” the Joint Inquiry concluded, “is that the informant’s contacts with the hijackers, had they been capitalized on, would have given the San Diego FBI field office perhaps the Intelligence Community’s best chance to unravel the September 11 plot.”

While the whole episode drew derision on the bureau, there was another government agency at least as culpable. By March 2000, only weeks after they had settled in San Diego, the CIA knew that Hazmi had arrived in California. They had long known that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa. The agency chose not to share that information with the FBI. None of the agents in San Diego had the right questions to ask.

3 FACES OF DR. SHAIKH: CO-OPTED?

At the July 31 hearing in New York, a lawyer for the 9/11 families drove home the point that Hazmi and Mihdhar did not arrive at Shaikh’s home by happenstance. “It was a plan that had been carefully and meticulously developed by Bayoumi in conjunction with other Saudi officials.”

Lawyers for the Kingdom deny Bayoumi played any such role. “Al Bayoumi did not introduce Shaikh to al Hazmi or al Mihdhar,” their motion reads, “and there is no evidence he had anything to do with them moving into Shaikh’s house.”

There are elements to Shaikh’s story that have not yet emerged in court – the assertion of a former senior FBI counterterrorism agent, identified only as CS-22, that the “post 9/11 investigation into Shaikh’s activities showed that he was receiving funds from the Saudi Arabian government while he was serving as an informant for the FBI.” CS-22’s statement is contained in a July 2021 sworn declaration by Donald Canestraro, a defense team investigator for Guantanamo detainee Ammar al Baluchi.

Then there is the fact that, although Shaikh repeatedly said the hijackers had not “used” his phone, later analysis of the records showed that they did at least receive calls on it. In Summer 2000 there were a flurry of calls to the house from the phone of a young Saudi prince, Nawaf bin Saud bin Mohammed bin al Saud. Between June and November, meanwhile, there were 16 calls from an al Qaeda safe house in Pakistan, FBI reports say.

A peculiar factor, if one is to accept the evidence that has emerged about the nature of Shaikh’s relationship with Bayoumi, is what he told 9/11 Commission staff in his only official interview. People, Shaikh said, including future hijacker Hazmi, had spoken of Bayoumi as having been “an agent” for the Saudis.

Shaikh was too old and ill to be formally interviewed for the current legal action against the Kingdom. Sources close to the investigation claim, however, that the evidence they have developed shows the FBI informant, Shaikh, as having all the traits of a “classic double agent.”

FBI handler Steven Butler told the Joint Inquiry that Shaikh had been “duped” by the hijackers. Responding to the new allegations about Shaikh’s role, former SAC Gore conceded it was possible Bayoumi paid or otherwise induced Shaikh to provide information on one acquaintance or another. Without seeing solid evidence he did not believe, he said firmly, that the man he had known would have wittingly worked for the Saudi regime.

If the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ arguments hold, it may be that such evidence is about to emerge.