Equity, Impact, Transparency: Rethinking Ed Vendor Contracts After ESSER

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government passed several relief packages totaling more than $193 billion in aid for K-12 schools. These funds expire on Sept. 30, 2024. The bottom line: Most of the money is obligated, spent and reimbursed, and there are no plans to pass any additional aid packages. Therefore, states and school districts must find new funding streams or scale back considerably on vendor contracts and other initiatives that are dependent on ESSER funding.

By one estimate , ESSER had made available $40 billion to $60 billion in new government funding to education contractors by 2023, with 40% spent on vendors and the rest on personnel and labor. The amount spent by states and districts to cover COVID contracts could be much higher. Anticipating the end of their ESSER funding, districts such as Boston Public Schools have moved contracting expenses once covered by federal relief funds onto their general budgets.

With the help of a contract database called govspend.com , I have been tracking national and regional patterns in what districts paid vendors to do before, during and after the pandemic.

In my forthcoming book, Private Ends, Public Means: Contemporary Dynamics in Educational Privatization , I identify several lessons from this large-scale experiment in federally subsidized education contracts.

First, ESSER-funded vendors helped school districts meet unique conditions but sometimes overlooked equitable access. At one level, vendor contracts supported public schools under emergency conditions in their mission of equal educational opportunity. One example is food service contracts that provided free lunches for pick-up when school cafeterias were closed. Contracts also arguably helped with continuity of instruction, which is another core responsibility of states and districts. Seven out of 10 traditional school districts used ESSER funds to purchase software during the pandemic and 9 out of 10 bought hardware, according to a study conducted by the Office of the Inspector General.

These purchases made sense, given the quick pivot to remote learning. However, the pressure to spend quickly and with limited oversight may have contributed to redundancies (too many devices) and equitable access issues (wifi hotspots that did not function in areas without broadband or were not strong enough to provide students with stable video and audio). When the next emergency hits schools, public money will presumably once again be up for grabs, particularly for those with the fastest hands. What mistakes were made in areas of educational equity? How can the private sector do better when the next emergency hits?

Second, with physical schools closed, large urban districts spent hundreds of millions of dollars on technology such as iPads, Chromebooks, laptops and software licenses to keep classes in session. Then, they used ESSER funds for repairs, upgrades and parts to keep the devices running. The spending spiked at the outset of the pandemic but still remained higher than pre-pandemic levels once schools reopened. Post-pandemic, vendors are looking for ways to get resource-strapped districts to buy more devices, simply to maintain profit margins. It’s up to districts to exercise good management by pressing pause and reassessing.

There are at least two ways to approach this. First, districts should reassess whether vendor contracts are based on evidence of impact. During the pandemic, companies with minimal track records increased sales at record pace. For example, one small, relatively unknown business specializing in chat-based tutoring saw its annual revenues explode from less than $100,000 before COVID to nearly $3 million by March 2022. This company signed contracts in nearly half the states and showed little sign of slowing once schools resumed in-person instruction. But the strong evidence base around high-impact tutoring specifies that services must be delivered in person, not remotely. The bar should never be lowered for public school students when it comes to equal access for quality instruction.

Third, it’s time to commit to transparency and ensure that the public has the information about and input into vendor contracts — particularly those addressing learning loss post-pandemic. That may mean reining in the use of noncompetitive bidding that state and local procurement policies allow during emergencies. In cities such as San Diego , noncompetitive bidding may have helped questionable vendors get contracts without proper vetting.

It also means requiring potential bidders to provide evidence of impact for high-needs student populations. I have been analyzing school board meetings across disparate regions of the country and found limited opportunities for public comment even on million-dollar purchases. Materials required by state or local law to help the public and school board make informed decisions, such as descriptions of how a digital product or service works, often are missing from the public record. Contracts commit taxpayer resources and are pivotal in shaping the quality of government-funded services. All stakeholders in education have the right to adequate and accurate information in all stages of contracting, from the bid to the contract to the decision on whether to renew. These are principles of performance-based contracting to which districts across the country have committed.

Fourth, account for the hidden costs for families of maintaining or eliminating certain types of vendor contracts. In my conversations with purchasing officers, I keep hearing that connectivity  — which districts made significant investments in during COVID — is on the chopping block. Further, there are no plans to upgrade or replace older laptops and iPads that were loaned to students. It’s the lower-income kids whose families will bear these costs. As districts assess which contracts to renew and which to ditch, they must be guided by principles of equitable access to high-quality digital content. Low-income families may not be at the table when ed tech contracts are cut, but they shouldn’t be expected to absorb costs interpreted narrowly as district savings.

During the pandemic, districts and states contracted with vendors to meet the unique needs of this emergency. Now that the public health crisis has passed and COVID funds are largely spent, it’s time for districts to reassess how vendor contracts support public schools in their core mission and to raise the bar for ensuring that purchased services and products directly address widening educational inequalities.