‘They’ve Forgotten Their Own Recent History’: Why Israel Won’t Move Toward Peace

The killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar this week could be an opening that might lead to the freeing of Israeli hostages and a cease-fire, but history suggests Israel and its enemies won’t take it. That’s the assessment of former U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker, a veteran diplomat known as “America’s Lawrence of Arabia” for his deep understanding of the Middle East.

Crocker spent nearly four decades representing America’s interests in the Arab world, serving as U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Kuwait, as well as to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now retired, Crocker believes the hostilities between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah — as well as Iran — are nowhere near to ending. The death of Sinwar, which followed the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah last month along with many other senior commanders, will result mainly in the continuation of a guerrilla war unless the U.S. and Israel work hard toward a cease-fire, Crocker says. And it also increases the likelihood that Iran will ramp up its nuclear weapons program.

The current situation is all too similar to what happened four decades ago when the Israelis invaded Lebanon, Crocker says. “That invasion and the subsequent Israeli occupation created Hezbollah. This invasion is not going to end it.” He adds: “One thing I've learned over years, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that the concept of the defeat of an adversary only has meaning in the mind of that adversary. If that adversary feels defeated, he is defeated. If he doesn't, he’s not.”

The following has been edited for length and clarity.

What does the death of Yahya Sinwar signify?

I would imagine the reason Sinwar lasted as long as he did is something akin to the reason Osama bin Laden lasted as long as he did. In other words, that these organizations were operating without direction from the leader. I would not see much change on the battlefield itself. That said, we know that Hamas has lost its organized capability to a very large degree but that would be the case with or without Sinwar.

In other words, because Sinwar was said to be mostly in hiding, ranging around the Gaza tunnel network and delivering messages by courier, we were already seeing guerrilla type activity and small bands of fighters acting on their own? That doesn't change?

I would think so. And we’re also seeing something of that sort in the north too, but with greater residual capability on the part of Hezbollah.

Recent months have seen a series of dramatic Israeli victories, including the decapitation of Hezbollah and Hamas, culminating in the death of Sinwar this week. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the “balance of power” in the region has changed in Israel’s favor. What is your response to that assessment?

I would say that’s premature. Clearly Hezbollah fights on. Rockets are still flying across the border, as are drones. They’re decentralized. Clearly Hamas as well as Hezbollah is decentralized. They’re certainly ground down in terms of their capability of delivering anything like a meaningful response. But I foresee a very long insurgency by Hamas.

And Hezbollah?

It’s a very different dynamic in the north. In a sense Netanyahu has set the bar very high, in that he’s trying to stop the rocket fire in a definitive way so that 60,000 Israelis can go back home. Though all Hezbollah has to do is keep enough rockets crossing the border to make that difficult.

It’s really a fog of war situation in that it’s very difficult to see what Hezbollah’s strength is right now.

I’m old enough to take a very long view. I was in Lebanon in 1982 when the Israelis invaded. They called their operation “Peace for Galilee.” And 42 years later Lebanon is further from peace than it was in ‘82 when that invasion kicked off. That invasion and the subsequent Israeli occupation created Hezbollah. This invasion is not going to end it.

We’re still expecting the Israeli response to last week’s Iranian missile attack. Recent reports have indicated the Israelis may not hit Iran’s nuclear or oil sites, but just military or intelligence targets, which could be less escalatory. What’s your assessment?

Well assuming that analysis is correct that they are not going to strike Iran’s oil or nuclear facilities, that leaves them a lot of latitude of what they do strike, but wherever they strike it’s not going to meaningfully change any power equation. What I think it will do is push the debate inside Iran in the direction of nuclear weaponization sooner rather than later.

You think that’s going to happen no matter what?

I do. Again, they just have to look at the global stage. You’ve got the Libyan example of what can happen if you forgo nuclear capability. And the North Korean example of what can happen if you maintain it.

So if a country gives up its nuclear weapons program, as Libya under Muammar Khaddafi did in 2003, then it’s all over. He was eventually ousted and killed. But if one has nuclear weapons one can forestall regime change, as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seems to be doing?

Yeah, I think so. The more vulnerable the Iranians look on non-nuclear options, be they proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah, or conventional missile capability, the greater the impetus will be in Tehran to opt for that nuclear capability.

Are you concerned that the Israelis have become overconfident?

I worry that they’ve forgotten their own recent history. They hailed the operation “Peace for Galilee" as a great victory after the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] withdrawal from Beirut. And of course what they got was Hezbollah, a far more lethal enemy than the PLO ever dreamed of being. So the idea that a ground invasion and subsequent occupation is somehow going to make Galilee safer is delusional.

One difference is how sophisticated these recent Israeli decapitation strikes have been against both Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the pager/walkie-talkie attacks. Does that make any difference?

One thing I've learned over years, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that the concept of the defeat of an adversary only has meaning in the mind of that adversary. If that adversary feels defeated, he is defeated. If he doesn't, he’s not. Will these decapitations make the adversary feel defeated? I guess time will tell but I would bet against it.

Why is that?

I was in Lebanon for the creation of Hezbollah, for which we paid dearly and the Israelis even more dearly. And I was in Lebanon as U.S. ambassador when the Israelis decapitated Hezbollah for the first time with the assassination of Abbas Musawi [the secretary-general of Hezbollah killed in 1992 when Israeli helicopters fired missiles at his motorcade]. And I had to be evacuated because of credible intelligence that there was a plan to assassinate me in retaliation. Well, that decapitation didn’t exactly weaken Hezbollah.

So what do you think the Israelis should do now?

I would take the win. Declare victory and let us work on some cessation of hostilities. In the north you got UN Resolution 1701 on the table, as it’s been since 2006 [calling for the withdrawal of Hezbollah from south of the Litani River in Lebanon, the disarmament and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon]. And another UN resolution from 2004 similarly worded. Those are the reference points, the scripts for everyone involved. It might be that some hardscrabble U.S. diplomacy is needed so as to broker at least a cease-fire in the north. And in Gaza I think everything needs to be directed toward getting hostages back.

That is something to work toward. This may be an interval in which Hezbollah and Iran for their own reasons may want a cease-fire. So if you can get that — enough of a cessation of hostilities to allow Israelis to return home — then you might be able to build toward some kind of implementation of 1701. That would also be the best way of dealing with Iran.

And specifically, what should be done to deal with Hamas? There are questions about who might take over Hamas. Some suggest it could be Khaled Meshaal, the former Hamas leader who lives in Qatar, or Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, if he’s still alive.

Any avenue that Sinwar’s death might open up in terms of the resolution of the hostage situation is something the Israelis should seize on. Again, the insurgency is not going to stop. But the capability that Hamas was operating at is pretty well eliminated for the time being. And I would hope that Israel will work indirectly to arrange a cease-fire that does allow whatever hostages are left alive to be returned. But we have no idea what’s going on in Hamas inside Gaza. We have no idea how many hostages are left alive. And who controls them and who could make the decision to release them.

What about the prospect of some kind of political settlement? Netanyahu for the first time in his speech indicated to Palestinians that if they let the hostages out they’ll be OK. How is that being taken right now inside Gaza?

It’s very difficult to know from the outside. You’ve seen the reactions of Palestinians in Gaza that have been reported. Some say they are bound to fight to the last Palestinian, others are hoping Sinwar’s death will mean an end to the misery. If I were an Israeli policymaker, I would put every resource and element of imagination I could into the return of the hostages.

But what about the larger picture in the Mideast? Before Oct. 7 there were diplomatic maneuvers to normalize relations between the other Arab states and Israel, including with Saudi Arabia. Some speculate this is one reason Hamas attacked when it did. Now a year later, we have a situation where the Israelis are dominant on the battlefield. Does that set up the possibility for a broader diplomatic solution if the Israelis handle it right?

A further broadening of Israel’s diplomatic ties in the region is definitely a possibility. One of the things that did not happen in the year since the Gaza war started has been the breaking of relations by any Arab state currently at peace with Israel. I think there will be impetus inside Saudi Arabia to move toward normalization with Israel, particularly if Iran moves toward nuclear weapons capability. But what that does not do of course is move anything toward a Palestinian settlement.

What do you think Israel, under the current hard-line government, will do?

I would be very skeptical that anything meaningful is going to emerge from an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. What is not lost in the current crisis but is sublimated somewhat given the acuity of the situations in Gaza and Lebanon is the West Bank. Israeli actions there [in seeking to violently uproot the Palestinian population], both by setters and by the IDF, do not bode well for any meaningful negotiation with the Palestinians.

This is a somewhat grimmer picture than some people are painting. Others are suggesting that we are entering a new period that Netanyahu called “the day after.” You are much more skeptical.

Again, I remember when we thought the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the Palestinian evacuation brokered by the United States was going to set the stage for a comprehensive peace in the Mideast. That was the famous Reagan Initiative. But it ended almost before it began. And I do not see this as much more hopeful. I go back to what I learned through bitter experience. Unless your enemy feels defeated, he’s not.

And you don’t think Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran feel defeated?

No, I don't.

What’s the danger of Israeli overconfidence?

If they talk themselves into believing that their incredible feats of arms and intelligence actually constitute a victory, then that is very dangerous. And it becomes doubly dangerous if we start to believe it. Go back to that Reagan initiative. If we believe that the damage done to Hezbollah’s leadership and the elimination of Sinwar and other Hamas leaders somehow translates into a new dynamic for peace, that we can somehow lever that into a visionary global settlement — that way lies madness.

I don’t see anything good coming from this. I think the Israelis are thinking in terms of a prolonged military occupation of Gaza and that will simply produce a prolonged insurgency. One thing that has fundamentally changed since Oct. 7 is the Israeli willingness to accept a certain number of IDF casualties in the longer run that is greater than they would have ever dreamed of before Oct. 7. In the 18 years in Lebanon, from 1982 to 2000, they lost about 1,100 troopers. Up through Oct. 6, 2023, that was a huge number that no Israeli government would ever entertain losing again. But losing 1,200 more in one day, men, women and children, changed that calculus. So the willingness of Israel writ large to accept a prolonged insurgency in Gaza and indefinite occupation is much higher than it was before Oct. 7.

This is all happening three weeks before the U.S. election. We’ve been told by sources that Netanyahu has no interest in resolving any of this diplomatically until he knows who the next U.S. president is going to be.

I would certainly hope that’s not the case. I think there is a necessity to try to change the dynamic on the ground right now. I would assume there is going to be mounting pressure on the Netanyahu government to do just that, to free hostages and halt rocket fire coming across the border at least temporarily.