Report finds ‘no evidence’ Hawaii officials prepared for wildfire that killed 102 despite warnings

HONOLULU (AP) — Investigators reviewing the emergency response to last year’s wildfire that killed 102 people on Maui said in a report released Friday they found “no evidence” Hawaii officials made preparations for it, despite days of warnings that critical fire weather was coming.

That lack of planning hindered efforts to evacuate the historic town of Lahaina before it burned, the report said.

A forecaster with the National Weather Service emailed fire managers an “unprecedented advance warning” on Aug. 4, 2023, of the danger that would develop on Aug. 8, including extreme winds as a hurricane passed far to the south, according to the report released by the state attorney general.

But in the ensuing days, the report found, there is no evidence that key agencies — the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, Maui Fire Department, Maui Police and others — developed plans for dealing with severe wildfire risk, such as by having extra staff on duty, stationing emergency vehicles or supplies in high-risk areas, or plotting possible evacuations.

“The strongly worded nature of the email, had it been communicated to fire managers in other states with better developed severity preparedness strategies, could have gained attention and prompted discussion and operational planning,” the report said. “It was a call for State of Hawaii fire managers to prepare for the impending extreme weather.”

The heroic efforts of firefighters and police — who frequently risked their lives, sometimes sprinting door to door to warn residents to leave — were undercut by the lack of planning as the deadliest U.S. wildfire in a century destroyed thousands of buildings.

A Maui County spokeswoman said the county received the report when it was released to the public and wouldn’t be able to comment until officials had an opportunity to review it. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency didn’t immediately respond with comment.

“This investigation serves as a wake-up call for the state and county governments to learn from the past and urgently prepare for the future,” Attorney General Anne Lopez said in a statement.

Maui fire commanders discussed the forecast, but “no evidence of pre-event preparedness plans by the MFD were produced,” the report said. The police and fire departments never established a unified incident command post or action plan, and as a result it was more difficult to know who was responding to what, where to direct resources, or which evacuation routes were blocked by downed trees or power lines.

The departments share a mobile command vehicle, but the county did not provide evidence that it was used that day, the report said. Some emergency vehicles didn’t have equipment for clearing roadblocks.

Hawaiian Electric Co. has acknowledged that its power lines caused a fire the morning of Aug. 8. Firefighters who responded believed they had extinguished it. But, the report notes, they had limited access to the area due to steep terrain and unstable power lines overhead, making it difficult to determine if the fire was truly out.

The fire that destroyed Lahaina later that day ignited in the same area. Maui County’s report on the cause of the catastrophe has not been released.

With multiple fires burning on Maui that day, police focused on routine duties like traffic control rather than preparing for an evacuation, the report said. The police and fire departments operated separately, hindering communication as winds toppled utility poles, cutting power and cell service.

Maui County and the state use private contractors to help fight fires with water tankers and heavy equipment. But those contractors weren’t trained to use portable radios, and with cell service down many had to communicate with firefighters in person. Firefighters had to flag down water tankers to ask them to fight fires. Some hydrants failed as the fire melted water lines.

Maui Fire Department policy requires relief engines — those that back up the front-line fleet during major events — to be ready to respond to an emergency. But some lacked breathing equipment and portable radios, the report said. Personnel at fire stations spent valuable time locating and loading hoses, nozzles and hand tools.

And despite the warnings, the heads of the county emergency management agency and the Maui Fire Department were off-island that day, attending conferences in Honolulu. The report said no one appeared to be in charge of strategic resource allocation.

Some of the challenges facing officials and residents were particular to Hawaii and Maui: narrow roads clogged with parked cars and private dirt roads blocked by gates.

Many older, wooden homes were separated by less than 6 feet (1.8 meters), and residents frequently left windows open, making it easier for the fire to spread.

Some people died in their cars. Others leaped into the ocean to escape the flames.

The 518-page report, conducted by the Fire Safety Research Institute, is the second part of a three-part attempt by officials to understand the tragedy and how best to avoid such disasters in the future.

The review determined that the lack of planning fit a long pattern of apathy to wildfire risk in Hawaii, where tsunamis and hurricanes are considered more pressing dangers, and it was among many factors that set the stage for the catastrophe.

The report suggested that fire managers might have focused on the first sentence of the National Weather Service’s email, which noted Hurricane Dora was expected to pass south of the state, rather than make landfall, and thus assumed Hawaii was safe.

Nationally, the report noted, people think of Hawaii as a tropical vacation destination, not fire-prone. Even among residents it may be difficult to get excited about wildfire risk when “red-flag weather” — hot, dry and windy — isn’t much different from a typical summer day.

“This gap between risk perception and reality seems to have contributed to a relative underinvestment in wildfire prevention, preparedness and response capacity over the years,” the report said.

Even though a 2018 wildfire in West Maui near Lahaina burned 2,000 acres (810 hectares), destroyed 21 structures and forced 600 people into shelters, the Maui Police Department’s “Natural and Man-Made Disaster Plan” didn’t include wildfires.

The Maui Fire Department has policies for responding to hurricanes — a hurricane watch requires a staffing roster and rotational schedule for relief personnel, for example. But the department had no such policies for high fire danger, the report said.

And even though Maui County passed legislation in 2022 giving the fire department the authority to require property owners to clear vegetation, such as the dry invasive grasses that helped fuel the Aug. 8 fire, under penalty of a $1,000 fine, the county “has not produced any evidence that the MFD has enforced these amendments in the Lahaina area,” the report said.

It called for better vegetation management and fire breaks. It also recommended providing alternate means of firefighting water supply for extreme events, including portable pumps to draw from pools, ponds and even the ocean.

The Maui Police Department should develop safe evacuation procedures, and the fire department should establish operating procedures for bad fire weather, it said.

“Things need to change, and preparedness is where it starts,” Derek Alkonis, of the review team, told a news conference Friday.

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Johnson reported from Seattle. Associated Press reporters Mark Thiessen in Anchorage, Alaska; Claire Rush in Portland, Oregon; Claudia Lauer in Philadelphia; Jacques Billeaud in Phoenix; and Christopher L. Keller in Albuquerque, New Mexico, contributed.