The new head of the British Army , the chief of the general staff, has outlined an ambitious plan to transform the United Kingdom's land force so it can effectively fight a major war with Russia .
In a late July speech, Gen. Sir Roland "Roly" Walker said he wanted to double the British Army's fighting power within two years and triple it by 2030. As Walker put it, "If we can double and then triple our fighting power, any British land force will be able to destroy an enemy force at least three times its size and keep on doing that."
This strategy reflects the general's professional experience. Between 1997 and 2008, Walker served with the British Army's premier special forces unit, the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. He later commanded all U.K. Special Forces. This is relevant because the SAS focuses on aggressive direct action and reconnaissance/sabotage operations deep behind enemy lines. Indeed, as first reported by the Washington Examiner in August 2022, U.K. Special Forces have been instrumental in shaping Ukrainian operations behind Russian lines. Walker's SAS heritage was notable in comments such as, "We have got to hunt for advantage, forage lethality from wherever we can find it."
But Walker's strategy is also designed to gel with Prime Minister Keir Starmer's new government. While Starmer wants to maintain close cooperation with the United States and NATO , he has not matched his predecessor Rishi Sunak's pledge to spend at least 2.5% of gross domestic product on defense (Starmer says the U.K. will meet the 2%-of-GDP NATO target and the 2.5% expenditure when economic conditions allow). In practice, this means Walker isn't going to get more troops and a vast increase in capabilities anytime soon. But with that in mind, Walker's objectives seek to achieve the best possible strategic capability. Namely, better complementing U.S. and NATO military contingencies for war with Russia. As an extension, Walker thus offers Starmer ammunition to take to NATO headquarters and to Washington, D.C., in support of the U.K.'s continued defense relevance.
In his speech, Walker admitted his limitations. He observed that the British Army's 75,000 standing complement makes it a "medium-sized" force. But emphasizing the need for "velocity," Walker outlined how the Army must evolve to grapple with the battlefield disruptions born of new technologies.
As he put it, "Tactics may well win us the first encounter, but on a transparent battlefield, they are understood completely by the end of the second encounter and are unceremoniously unpicked in the third. There is, therefore, to my mind, no such thing as a templated tactical solution to a battlefield problem anymore. Today’s tacticians must partner with technicians at every level to constantly spiral the system that underpins their fighting power, giving tactics an invaluable configurability and flexibility."
Walker then outlined how this pertains to commanding in the field: "Commanders, therefore, must be systems integrators first and foremost, understanding the technology of their lethality as well as the tactical application of it."
Translation: Combat forces must be less predictable, more flexible, and faster in their delivery of violent effects against the enemy. Officers must be smarter and more technically proficient in their employment of and mitigation against new technologies such as drones, artificial intelligence, and integrated systems. The implicit point here is that forward commanders will have to operate with far greater individual innovation and at far greater speed.
Walker said he wants the British Army to fight by aggressive reconnaissance — disrupting an enemy's front. This effort will involve shoot-on-the-scoot artillery systems emplaced on armored fighting vehicles. Aggressive reconnaissance will also help the Army identify targets for annihilation by other NATO air and heavy artillery forces. Walker also explained the need to hide and disperse holding and reserve forces and logistics nodes. This is a key lesson of the war in Ukraine: Remaining visible and static is a recipe for inviting heavy destruction. The threat of platforms such as cheap combat drones looms especially large in this regard.
What would this strategy look like in practice?
It would seem to have the British Army adopt, at a greater scale, the disruptive war-fighting approach of the British Royal Marines commando battalions. Walker wants the U.K.'s land force to be able to get at and behind Russian offensive lines early in any war, attempting to take advantage of the poor command and control evinced by Russia's combined arms operations in Ukraine. In essence, this is a strategy designed to create friction at depth, reducing Russian means of advancing early and consolidating quickly.
This rapid advance-consolidate strategy is the enduring centerpiece of Russian war planning, designed to employ military force to quickly establish a new political status quo in which NATO must choose between a Russia-favorable ceasefire or a bloody contest that risks escalation toward nuclear conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin would hope that in such a scenario, NATO resolve would fracture between states such as the U.S., the U.K., the Baltics, and Poland, which would fight to retake territory, and others such as Germany, Spain, and Italy, which would favor compromise.
However, to deter-defeat this Russian ambition, the British Army must be able to move quickly, aggressively, and lethally. Getting the force into that state will not be easy.
The British Army's current rapid deployment structure centers on its 1st Division (now including the Army's 16 Air Assault Brigade rapid reaction force), its new Ranger Regiment, and its Special Forces. But its limited size and resources mean that it would not be able to sustain its high-end war-fighting for very long without allied support. As with the other European armies , the British Army lacks any significant airlift/paradrop capacity, for example.
Walker's planning must rightly anticipate a worst-case scenario, that of a reconstituted, emboldened, and battle-hardened Russian military. The associated concern of combat sustainability at the front is something that Walker's predecessor, Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders, also recognized. Sanders left his post after tensions with the Chief of Defense Staff (U.K. equivalent to the chairman of joint chiefs), Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, over what he viewed as excessive cuts to the Army's size. Hence why Walker wants to adapt the British Army's strategy to a limited force scale reality. He is supervising a shift away from sustainable mass toward rapid, if temporary, maneuver at depth.
But Walker likely has valuable allies in this pursuit.
For one, the man appointed to become Starmer's next national security adviser, Gwyn Jenkins, is a former commanding officer of the Royal Navy's Special Boat Service (U.K. equivalent of the U.S. Navy SEALs). His similar military background suggests he may share Walker's interest in a strategy of aggressive forward reconnaissance. The U.S. Army will also welcome Walker's planning, recognizing that the more European armies can get more well-trained, aggressive-minded forces quickly forward, the more time NATO will buy for the arrival of U.S. and Polish heavy maneuver forces.
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Top line: Walker's agenda is highly ambitious but also good news for the U.S. and NATO.
The British Army is the closest and most interoperable foreign ally of the U.S. Army. If Germany and other NATO freeloaders spend more on logistics trains and forces built around mass, the British Army and better NATO allied counterparts will have a potent means of fighting Russia. And thus, a more potent means of deterrence. Walker's strategy of fighting to win quickly will complement the U.S. Army. At the margin, it may also help reduce U.S. Air Force and Navy (and some U.S. Army) requirements in the European theater, freeing up U.S. resources to deter-defeat China.
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