Search and rescue operations highlighted on final day of hearing into Titan tragedy

NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. (WCBD) – For the final day of a top-level Coast Guard investigation into why an experimental submersible catastrophically failed diving to the Titanic wreck site, witnesses have dived into the search and rescue operations that began when the Titan sub lost contact with its support vessel the Polar Prince.

On June 18, 2023, the Titan submersible stopped responding to its mother ship, the Polar Prince, after it set sail from St. Johns in Newfoundland, Canada, to explore the Titanic’s remains.

On June 22, Odysseus, a remotely operated vehicle (ROV), found Titan debris, and the Coast Guard confirmed that the sub’s carbon fiber hull suffered catastrophic failure.

Coast Guard Sector Boston Commander Captain Jamie Frederick said the sector command received a call on June 18 at 5:40 p.m. EST reporting an overdue submersible at the sight of the Titanic. This put the responders in the distress phase.

Professional watchstanders immediately went through checklists, one for subsurface search and rescue and one for an overdue vessel, according to Capt. Frederick, the search was multidimensional for several reasons.

He said a U.S. Coast Guard C-130 was on deck in St. Johns and sent to conduct a surface search over the area. Planes flew “nose-to-tail” up until debris was found on June 22. “Nose-to-tail” means that as soon as one plane lands, another will take off to search the area, Capt. Frederick explained.

Responders sought remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) that could be at the incident location in a timely manner.

The nearest ROVs were on a ship called the Deep Energy, and they could only dive to 3000 meters. The ROVs were utilized, and one attempted to dive deeper than 3,000 meters but failed. Once a 6000-meter ROV responded, debris was found quickly.

Sonar sounds were detected coming from buoys near the incident site. However, when that data was sent to the Navy, they determined it was not sonar noise from humans.

When the ROV found the tail cone debris Thursday morning, Unified Command determined the incident to be a total loss. Capt. Frederick said.

Capt. Frederick said he has never had to conduct a subsurface search in his 30-year Coast Guard career. Multiple witnesses throughout the hearing said the last fatal submersible incident was in the early 1970s.

During the public hearing into the Titan loss, Capt. Frederick said he had learned more information than he knew at the time of the search and rescue (SAR) operation. He estimated the SAR team did not have “a fraction” of what has been revealed.

Below are the daily briefing slides used during the first district’s SAR operation:

Following Capt. Frederick, Search and Rescue Specialist Scott Talbot, based out of Sector New Orleans, testified that he was tasked with conducting a case study on the Titan SAR operation.

Talbot said he gathered a team of five board members to analyze the operation, lessons learned, coordination practice, and challenges faced.

According to Talbot, the Coast Guard’s SAR was likely overwhelmed by this incident. His team identified issues in four main categories.

1. Critical Incident Communication: This communication was delayed nearly 18 hours, and Quick Response Cards, which are standard checklists to complete when incidents are reported, were not completed all the way.
2. Case Documentation: There were several deficits, and Talbot’s team attributed them to the “sheer volume of information” coming in. The SAR team also used an outdated and “archaic” documentation system that could not be kept up.
3. SAR System and Incident Command System Integration: These systems did not integrate properly, which “impacted a few key decision makers” and prohibited efficiency.
4. On-Scene Presence: The Coast Guard representative sent was not trained correctly or suited for the role, which Talbot said likely happened because leadership was overwhelmed. The Polar Prince was initially designated as the On-Scene Coordinator. Capt. Frederick also acknowledged this was not ideal but necessary at the beginning of the SAR operation.

Talbot’s board determined that the Coast Guard is incapable of sub-surface search and rescue.

The U.S. Navy is the primary source for complex underwater SAR incidents. The Navy’s vessels would take a few days to get to the incident scene, so other options had to be considered, according to Capt. Frederick.

Below is the publicly releasable information from Talbot’s case study:

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