OceanGate co-founder to speak at Coast Guard hearing for Titan implosion

NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C. (WCBD) – Monday’s hearing will begin with testimony from OceanGate’s Argentinian Co-Founder, Guillermo Sohnlein, who left the exploration company in 2013.

Following Sohnlein, the Coast Guard panel will hear from Roy Thomas, senior engineer for the American Bureau of Shipping, which classes and certifies submersibles. The Titan was not classed when it imploded on its way to the Titanic.

Closing out the day, former OceanGate Engineering Director Phil Brooks will testify about his time with the company. Brooks became engineering director after Tony Nissen, whom the panel heard from on the first day of the public hearing.

On the latest day of the hearing, a former OceanGate contractor explained how she felt when raising safety concerns. She told the panel about one instance where she was taken off the navigation team after notifying superiors of an issue with the navigation system.

Former OceanGate Marine Operations Director David Lochridge, who turned whistleblower, detailed numerous issues he fought to correct with former OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush during his testimony. He concluded by saying that if OSHA had investigated his complaint further, the Titan’s implosion may have been avoided.

LIVE UPDATES:

4:36 p.m.

Hearing adjourned.

4:34 p.m.

Brooks leaves on closing statement:

4:26 p.m.

Brooks said there was concern on his part regarding the drop weight motors that was not addressed.

4:23 p.m.

Brooks believed he emailed other OceanGate employees regarding safety issues and concerns.

His final conversation when he left the company was a phone call.

3:50 p.m.

Brooks said Stockton’s explanation of the loud bang sounded plausible and the previous engineering director also agreed with Stockton’s assessment.

3:49 p.m.

There was no discussion on dive 80 about reaching out to a third-party to investigate after the loud bang.

3:48 p.m.

Brooks said he did have concerns that OceanGate did not have an independent team to review the data. He said on some level it really just required him to research everything about strain data and do the best he could.

3:47 p.m.

Brooks tasks were to prepare the data from the real time monitoring system and disseminate to other members of the OceanGate team, he testified.

3:37 p.m.

In 2021 and 2022 there was constant maintenance on the sub, Brooks said.

In addition to technical reasons, the company also asked employees to forgo paychecks for a period of time and felt safety was being overlooked, Brooks said. He did not think the company should be diving the Titan to the Titanic in 2023.

Brooks explains the full reason why he left OceanGate below:

3:36 p.m.

There was no maintenance completed on the Titan hull between 2022 and 2023 expeditions, he testified. Brooks left in February 2023.

3:35 p.m.

Going back to a previous topic, Brooks said other than the one bang on dive 80 he does not remember another time where a bang occurred during dives.

3:22 p.m.

Stockton thought the loud bang came from the frame as it came back up and adjusted back to its original shape on dive 80. On dives 81, 82 and 83, Brooks said there were no other instances of abnormal data and that is why the team continued on, he testified.

3:12 p.m.

Brooks said following dive 80, he decided to leave around this time due to issues he was having with Stockton’s judgement calls at the time including the additional tests needed.

Brooks wanted to take the Titan back to Everett and pull it apart after dive 80, but Stockton said no because the company could not afford that.

3:11 p.m.

There was no discussion on whether to do unmanned test dives following the incident on dive 80, Brooks said.

3:09 p.m.

Brooks says he does not think he is qualified to determine what a shift in real time monitoring system strain data meant. This question comes after Brooks explains the loud bang showed a shift in strain data during dive 80.

3:06 p.m.

Stockton made the decision to resume dives after the loud bang.

3:03 p.m.

When the loud band occurred on dive 80 the team inspected the hull and looked at the strain data from the real time monitoring system, according to Brooks

3:01 p.m.

When the loud band occurred on one of Titan’s test dives, there was an acoustic anomaly on the real time data, Brooks said.

2:59 p.m.

The team used ping tests to determine whether sensors on the real time monitoring system were working, according to Brooks.

If a sensor was not working during a dive there would not be a display for the pilot.

2:40 p.m.

Brooks describes tests performed on the final carbon fiber Titan hull. This is the hull the Titan had when it imploded.

2:35 p.m.

Brooks describes downloading data from the real time monitoring system:

2:01 p.m.

Stockton was the primary person who determined the color procedure on the real time monitoring system which was green, yellow and red, however he did listen to engineering team suggestions.

1:59 p.m.

If the real time monitoring hit a red color, which was the alarm, the sub would then resurface, Brooks said.

He explained there were a few times where the system went yellow and red, but they were toward the end of dives.

1:55 p.m. -1:56 p.m.

The point of the real time monitoring system is so the submersible pilot can access the health of the hull as the submersible drops and if need be, resurface.

The real time monitoring was the main way to check that the submersible was running smoothly during a dive.

There were no audible alarms on the system because Stockton was against them, Brooks said.

Everyone aboard the submersible could see the monitoring systems and the visual alarms that would pop up if something was wrong.

1:50 p.m.

Brooks breaks down real time monitoring system on the Titan while he was with OceanGate and how it worked:

1:44 p.m.

Brooks says Titan data for the real time monitoring system from the Bahamas test dives in 2019 was not being acquired correctly. The team was grabbing only the peaks from the data and had no time tracking or depth data which made it impossible to analyze.

In the fall of 2019, Brooks began redoing the software so it could be collected properly and analyzed, he testified.

1:43 p.m.

Brooks said his focus was mostly software and mechanical engineering when it came to working on the Titan submersible at OceanGate.

Brooks does not have a background in materials engineering.

Brooks started at OceanGate in 2019 and left in 2023.

1:38 p.m.

Brooks details professional and educational background.

1:35 p.m.

Phil Brooks called to the witness stand.

12:37 p.m.

Recess called until 1:35 p.m.

12:33 p.m.

Thomas leaves on closing statements giving update suggestions regarding submersibles:

12:31 p.m.

At one point the Titan was left outside to weather the elements for an extended period of time. Thomas testifies this can cause degradation of materials and ABS has rules on how to store materials in a controlled environment.

12:28 p.m.

Thomas explains whether companies have attempted to class submersibles with carbon fiber hulls. No submersibles with carbon fiber hulls have ever been successfully classed.

12:26 p.m.

Thomas said deciding what would be the best coating on a carbon fiber hull is still under testing.

12:19 p.m.

Life support systems are critical during the ABS process including testing life support systems in test dives, Thomas said.

Ballast systems are also critical in ABS testing.

12:15 p.m.

ABS has not been involved in non-standard submersible design, Thomas said.

If ABS had been involved when the forward dome fell off the Titan during testing and when a loud bang occurred upon resurfacing in a separate Titan incident, ABS would have had to been surveyed and an investigation would have to be complete, according to Thomas.

He said in these situations ABS should be contacted immediately.

12:13 p.m.

A submersible is not a diving system according to ABS, Thomas said.

12:11 p.m.

Thomas reads ABS submersible passenger definition:

11:23 a.m.

Thomas covers key questions regarding carbon fiber pressure hulls:

11:22 a.m.

Carbon fiber materials are not listed as ABS approved materials for a submersible pressure hulls, according to Thomas’ presentation.

11:18 a.m.

Brief history of Antipodes which was the first submersible owned by OceanGate for a period of time.

11:10 a.m.

Thomas explains pressure hull requirements for passenger submersibles through a presentation. The full presentation is below:

11:09 a.m.

The ABS did not perform any services for the Titan submersible and OceanGate did not have any contact with ABS regarding it.

11:02 a.m.

Thomas details professional background.

11:00 a.m.

Roy Thomas called to testify.

10:47 a.m.

Sohnlein leaves on closing statements:

10:43 a.m.

“If anything happens, I want it to only impact me,” Stockton allegedly told Sohnlein before the first manned dive in the Titan.

Stockton was first and only person to go down in the Titan during the first dive.

10:42 a.m.

Sohnlein never went on dives or expeditions down in the Titan. He got into the business because he never had a desire and wanted to make room for people on the sub who wanted to go.

10:39 a.m.

Sohnlein does not know whether mission specialists were ever paid.

10:37 a.m.

It did not make sense for the pilot to have a 100 ton license to pilot the Antipodes based off its measurements and build, according to Sohnlein.

10:33 a.m.

Sohnlein says he doesn’t remember if mission specialists were on any of the Antipodes dives while he was there or if anyone paid to go on them.

10:32 a.m.

Crew members spent months learning how to dive the sub doing training dives in Miami, according to Sohnlein.

10:31 a.m.

Antipodes operated in Puget Sound, Monterey, Catalina Island and Miami while Sohnlein was there.

10:28 a.m.

Sohnlein said no one from NTSB reached out to him regarding safety concerns on the submersibles owned by OceanGate. Passengers were not limited strictly to scientists on the subs while Sohnlein was there.

10:26 a.m.

Antipodes was created from a larger underwater vehicle, Sohnlein said.

10:23 a.m.

Sohnlein said the entire time he was at OceanGate the company only operated in US waters.

10:18 a.m.

OceanGate bought the Lula 500 which later turned into the Cyclops 1.

10:17 a.m.

Sohnlein said he did register Antipodes with the state of Washington during his time with OceanGate.

10:15 a.m.

Marketing people helped craft the definition a mission specialist, but regulatory people did not. He does not remember whether Antipodes was insured.

10:12 a.m.

Sohnlein testifies that there was a former Coast Guard admiral on the OceanGate board, but he never met him. He only knew Stockton thought highly of him.

10:09 a.m.

The board was there to “prepare the company for the future growth phase,” according to Sohnlein during his time.

10:08 a.m.

Sohnlein was a member of the Marine Technology Society. He did later learn about the letter of concern drafted by MTS, but he was no longer apart of the organization. He has never seen the letter.

10:06 a.m. – 10:07 a.m.

Sohnlein said the company moved operation to Miami for less than a year in 2012. He also still has shares in OceanGate.

10:01 a.m. – 10:04 a.m.

Sohnlein left OceanGate in January 2013 and the CEO title was transferred to Stockton in August 2012. He said “it made sense” for Stockton to take over as the company was transitioning into the “engineering phase.”

He said Stockton wanted him to stay, but he decided to leave because the company was not going to be operating as a business but building the sub and he wanted avoid internal conflict so he left.

As a shareholder, Sohnlein said the company paying his salary when his operations role would not really be utilized was a waste.

10:00 a.m.

OceanGate did have a board of directors while Sohnlein was there which was about 4 or 5 members with Stockton Rush as board chair. Sohnlein said he didn’t pay much attention to board dynamics.

No one on the board was responsible for regulations and compliance, he testified.

9:59 a.m.

Submersible operations were paid for by OceanGate Inc.’s budget which came from investor money during the time Sohnlein was there.

9:56 a.m.

The purpose of the OceanGate Foundation was to pay for research grants for researchers and to raise awareness dealing with education and science. One example of a way it would help was when pilots would go speak to kids at schools about ocean exploration, according to Sohnlein.

9:52 a.m.

Coast Guard documents from Aug. 2012 say the passenger for hire plan from OceanGate was denied in Miami. Sohnlein said these documents come from when he was turning the company over to Rush and OceanGate was shutting down Miami operations.

9:50 a.m.

Sohnlein said the company did not take Antipodes to Miami until they had Coast Guard approval after OceanGate shared there plans for what they were going to do there.

Sohnlein said they would not have brought the sub to Miami otherwise.

9:46 a.m.

Sohnlein questioned on specific statements made to media before beginning Miami OceanGate operations and touches on OceanGate Foundation role:

9:43 a.m.

OceanGate subs were never going to be passenger vessels. Sohnlein said all of the 6 missions he performed with Antipodes, the company sat down Coast Guard sector commanders beforehand.

9:39 a.m.

After buying the Antipodes, OceanGate brought in the man who created it and had him helped with everything involving the sub. Sohnlein also got involved in a society made for subs and regulatory compliance regarding the sub.

9:38 a.m.

Rush spearheaded the fundraising and Sohnlein was not heavily involved, he testified.

9:26 a.m.

Later in 2009 to 2010, the company explored building their own sub with a carbon-fiber hull, Sohnlein said.

9:25 a.m.

It costs millions and millions to go diving in a sub. The model for OceanGate was to make diving more accessible for people and make it to where people could pay to go on instead of having to buy the sub, the support vehicle, and maintenance, etc.

9:19 a.m. – 9:23 a.m.

Sohnlein said developing subs was not in the original plans for OceanGate. Stockton was supposed to fund the company and Sohnlein was going to develop.

The company bought the Antipodes to learn the inner workings of subs. The business plan was to charter deep-diving subs not building them, according to Sohnlein.

9:15 a.m.

Sohnlein describes the original mission for OceanGate in depth and the costs and effort it takes to have working deep diving submersibles as well as the relationship between a sub and its support vessel:

9:13 a.m.

The vision of OceanGate was to create 4 or 5 deep diving submersibles that could carry 5 people and would be available for charter, Sohnlein said.

9:12 a.m.

OceanGate LLC was founded around October 2009 in Everett, Washington, according to Sohnlein.

9:08 a.m.

Sohnlein said he was first introduced to submersible in 2008. He and Stockton Rush met in the summer of 2009.

9:03 a.m.

Sohnlein details his professional background.

9:00 a.m.

Sohnlein called to the witness stand.

8:35 a.m.

Recess called until 9 a.m.

8:34 a.m.

The Coast Guard reviewed former OceanGate contractor Antonella Wilby’s NDA and determined it did not prevent her from sharing safety concerns.

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