Federal judge denies six motions to dismiss Tyre Nichols criminal case months before trial

A federal judge on July 12 denied six motions to dismiss aspects of the indictment against former Memphis police officers charged in the Tyre Nichols federal criminal case.

Many of the motions were filed in January and February, with one being filed in June. Five of the six motions were filed by attorneys for Emmitt Martin III and were joined by the other defendants.

Five now-former Memphis Police Department officers were indicted in the criminal case — Tadarrius Bean, Demetrius Haley, Martin, Desmond Mills and Justin Smith — and each charged with the same four counts. The first count was using excessive force and failing to intervene, the second count was deliberate indifference, the third count was conspiracy to witness tamper and the fourth count was witness tampering.

Mills in November entered a guilty plea that included excessive force and conspiracy to witness tamper.

The first ruling issued by Judge Mark S. Norris on July 12 denied Bean's motion to dismiss three counts, citing the prosecution's failure to give "fair notice of [Bean's] charges." Bean's attorneys filed the motion on Jan. 24.

"The court does not find the indictment insufficient for the reasons defendant suggests and thus declines to dismiss counts 2, 3 and 4 on that basis," Norris wrote in the ruling. "Because the indictment undeniably includes factual allegations, the court reads defendant’s motion to argue that the indictment is insufficient because it does not set forth every action defendants are alleged to have taken during and after Mr. Nichols’ arrest that could support the broader allegations included in the indictment. But 'the indictment need not list every possible factual basis for an element of a crime in an indictment.' Rather, its ‘recitation of statutory language must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description with which he is charged.’ And the indictment here does just that."

Norris then goes on to list each count that Bean's attorney requested be dismissed, listing where he believed the facts presented in the indictment supported each count Bean was charged with.

Norris then denied five motions to dismiss filed by Martin's attorneys. The first of those motions argued that counts one and two of the indictment be dismissed against Martin. Smith, Haley and Bean filed joinder notices on this motion.

Martin’s attorneys argued in the motion to dismiss that the law is unconstitutional writ large, unconstitutional as applied to him in this case and that it is insufficient in alleging the crime was committed.

In the facial challenge, Martin’s attorneys argue that the law "is facially unconstitutional for several reasons, including that the 'deprivation of rights' element does not describe what conduct is forbidden, that the scienter requirement of 'willfulness' is unconstitutionally vague and that the statute’s inherent vagueness violates separation of powers principles."

Norris denied the motion on these grounds, pointing to U.S. Supreme Court precedent that he is obligated to follow that says he should not scrutinize a Supreme Court ruling.

In the as-applied to Martin challenge, his attorneys here argue that the indictment does not explicitly say what amount of force was used by the former officers, which they say prevents the indictment from meeting the standard for unreasonable seizure.

Norris rejected these arguments as well, saying the arguments presented here were "not a good fit for an as-applied challenge." He added that the arguments about the amount of force used were premature to discuss pretrial, as that will be a burden the prosecution must meet during trial.

Norris also rejected arguments that prosecutors did not adequately allege counts one and two. According to Norris' ruling, both counts identified the "date, victim, individuals involved and the specific acts alleged to give rise to a violation of the statutes specified" and that the allegations provided adequate notice.

Norris' third denial came for a similar motion from Martin, this time arguing that counts three and four of the indictment were insufficient and vague as applied. That motion was filed on Feb. 7 with Bean, Haley and Smith joining it as well.

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Martin’s attorney argued that they should be dismissed because they recite the statute without alleging specific facts and evidence to support the charge. Norris ruled that the indictment sufficiently listed the facts and circumstances for the witness tampering and conspiracy charges in the indictment.

In response to the motion’s argument that the counts do not “provide a factual basis for corrupt persuasion,” among other aspects, Norris said again that the indictment does not need to include every fact that will appear during the case’s duration.

"It may be that the government will not be able to prove at trial that defendant 'corruptly persuaded' MPD detective 1 or that he intended that the information he provided be incomplete, false or misleading," Norris wrote. "But the motion now before the court concerns the sufficiency of the indictment, and there are enough facts in the indictment to put defendant on notice of the circumstances on which these charges are based."

Norris struck down two motions from Martin in a single order as well. Those motions, both of which were filed June 1, argued that count one should be dismissed for improperly alleging that Martin "willfully failed to intervene in the unlawful assault" and that the prosecution improperly stated Martin's duty to intervene.

Martin’s attorneys argued in their motion that the Fourth Amendment applies to affirmative actions, which are decisions that are actively taken during an incident, and that failing to intervene is not one of those. Norris disagreed with this argument.

"One’s failure to intervene when there is a duty to do so can constitute an affirmative action that subjects an individual to the deprivation of a right," Norris wrote in the ruling. "To claim otherwise disregards the purpose of intervention in this context, which is to prevent a constitutional violation altogether, or else stop the continuation of a constitutional violation that may also lead to additional violations."

Martin's attorneys also argued that the Fourth Amendment does not contain a duty to intervene.

This argument cited a ruling from the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that Martin’s attorneys argued showed that a duty to intervene was not contained within the Fourth Amendment. Norris also disagreed with this reading of the Sixth Circuit ruling, writing in his own ruling that “the court explicitly declined to identify the source of this theory of liability, much less hold that the Fourth Amendment does not cover the failure to intervene.”

The other motion argued that Martin did not have a duty to intervene, with Norris ruling that the prosecution may have to demonstrate that he did at trial, but that it does not need to prove that in the indictment.

The final motion denied by Norris was a motion to dismiss citing a duplicitous indictment. This was filed on Feb. 6 and joined by Bean.

Martin’s attorneys in this motion argued that prosecutors, by alleging multiple acts in a single count of the indictment, did not protect him from double jeopardy because “a general verdict of guilty upon that count would make it impossible to determine whether [Martin] was convicted of the act of assaulting Mr. Nichols or for failing to intervene in the assault of Mr. Nichols.”

Norris, in his ruling, said that he did not find the indictment to be duplicitous, adding that the way it was phrased is in line with how it generally should be approached by prosecutors.

"In fact, the commentary to that rule advises that this provision 'is intended to eliminate the use of multiple counts for the purpose of alleging the commission of the offense by different means or in different ways,'" Norris wrote in the ruling.

Norris extended this logic into the other charges as well, adding that additional jury instructions will be provided during trial, along with a special verdict form.

Lucas Finton is a criminal justice reporter with The Commercial Appeal. He can be reached at Lucas.Finton@commercialappeal.com, or (901)208-3922, and followed on X, formerly known as Twitter, @LucasFinton.