Where a trial court decided not to return three children to the custody of the respondents, that decision should be upheld despite the respondent mother’s argument that the trial court clearly erred by taking jurisdiction over the three children.
“In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right the trial court’s order of disposition. Shortly before this order was entered, the trial court, following an adjudication, found statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over the three minor children, KP, NB, and EJM, under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper care and custody due to neglect or abandonment) and (2) (unfit home environment due to neglect). Respondent-mother is a biological parent to all three children, while respondent-father is only NB’s biological parent. In Docket No. 367069, respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by taking jurisdiction over the three children. In Docket No. 367070, respondent-father argues that (1) the trial court’s findings were insufficient to support NB’s placement in foster care and (2) NB’s guardian ad litem (LGAL) rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.
“In Docket No. 367069, respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds to take jurisdiction over the children because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that either MCL 712A.2(b)(1) or (2) was satisfied. We disagree.
“Respondent-father argues that, in its order following the preliminary hearing, the trial court did not make sufficient findings under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2) to justify placing NB in foster care. We disagree.
“Respondent-father next argues that this Court should abandon precedent and rule that respondent-parents have standing to challenge the effectiveness of a child’s attorney. We decline respondent-father’s request.”
Dissenting judge’s comments
MALDONADO, J. (dissenting). “In this case, DHHS and the trial court flouted all Michigan and Federal safeguards for the preservation of Indian families. Because of this startling disregard for tribal rights, I dissent.
“A critical fact omitted from the majority opinion is that both respondent-parents claimed tribal heritage early in the proceedings, and a representative of the Chickasaw Nation Tribe testified at the preliminary hearing that KP was eligible for tribal membership. This fact triggered a slew of procedural and substantive safeguards created to remedy the systemic removal of Indian children from their families and from their tribes. Because these safeguards were ignored conditional reversal is necessary.
“To agree with the majority would be to imply that ICWA and MIFPA do not apply when they are ignored; I cannot join such an opinion. The record in this case is overflowing with flagrant, undeniable violations of ICWA and MIFPA, and these violations would undeniably mandate reversal had they been raised by the parties’ attorneys. The court did not comply with the notice requirements, did not provide active efforts toward preservation and reunification of the family, did not apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof at removal, and did not follow the hierarchy of placement preferences. I cannot ignore these breaches of DHHS’s and the court’s duties; therefore, I dissent. I would vacate the trial court’s order of adjudication and remand for proceedings compliant with ICWA and MIFPA.”
In re Peters/Brinton/Mathews; MiLW 08-107989, 7 pages; Michigan Court of Appeals unpublished per curiam; Riordan, J., O’Brien, J.; Maldonado, J., dissenting; on appeal from Berrien Circuit Court; Adil Haradhvala for appellant; Berrien County Prosecutor for appellee.
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