Where a defendant was 17 years old when he committed the offense that resulted in a 2001 conviction of felony murder and a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole, it was not an abuse of discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence to 35 to 60 years.
“Defendant, Damon Andrew Jackson, was 17 years old when he committed the offense that resulted in a 2001 conviction of felony murder and a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Following a second Miller [v Alabama , 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012)] hearing in 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant to 420 to 720 months’ (35 to 60 years) imprisonment. The prosecution appeals this sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that defendant’s counsel at the first Miller hearing was constitutionally ineffective and by concluding that defendant merited a term-of-years sentence. For the reasons herein, we reluctantly affirm defendant’s term of-years sentence.
“The record shows that the trial court considered each of the Miller factors, specified the aggravating and militating circumstances considered, and explained its reasons supporting the sentence imposed. At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court observed that the task before it was a ‘hard call’ because defendant had pieced together a ‘remarkable prison record,’ but the egregious nature of what happened weighed against ‘simply imposing the minimum sentence’ allowed by law. For this reason, the trial court imposed a term of-years sentence that required defendant to serve significantly more time before he would be eligible for parole. In light of the trial court’s thorough analysis of the Miller factors, the record evidence supporting that analysis, and when actually applying the deferential standard of appellate review, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by resentencing defendant to
a term-of-years sentence.”
Concurring judge’s comments
MURRAY, J. (concurring). “ First, in what has resulted in effectively immunizing individuals under 19 who commit murder from receiving a sentence of life without parole, Michigan caselaw governing the sentencing of juveniles convicted of murder has gone beyond what is required by statute or the constitution. Second, as a result of that caselaw, individuals like Damon Jackson who intentionally physically and sexually abused his one month-old son David resulting in his death can receive a term of years sentence and feel confident it will not be overturned on appeal. And although I am cognizant that an opinion concurring with an unpublished opinion will receive little (if any) attention in the annals of Michigan law, and that People v Taylor , 510 Mich 112; 987 NW2d 132 (2022), has put tight clamps on trial courts resentencing defendants under 19 to LWOP, it is still worth explaining what current Michigan caselaw is, and how it has essentially foreclosed the statutory penalty of LWOP for those who commit murder when 18 or younger even in these horrible circumstances.
“As will be explained below, in rendering its decision, the trial court placed significant weight on People v Bennett , 335 Mich App 409; 966 NW2d 768 (2021), both for its general statements on juvenile homicide sentencing, and its discussion diminishing the factor regarding the crime and its attendant circumstances. Though the trial court was not wrong to do so, as it is a published decision, Bennett (and some of the decisions it relied upon) contained several misstatements of controlling law.”
People v. Jackson; MiLW 08-107995, 11 pages; Michigan Court of Appeals unpublished per curiam; M. J. Kelly, J., Jansen, J.; Murray, J., concurring; on appeal from Kent Circuit Court; Katherine Wendt for appellant; Tina N. Olson for appellee.
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